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Abstract This paper endeavours to find out in how far public export insurance
schemes foster international trade. Thereto, a gravity equation is derived,
which accounts for the risk of financial losses in case firms contract defaulting
foreign buyers. Empirical results suggest that OECD countries issuing trade
credits with generous state-guarantees did not, during the 1999 to 2005 period,
witness more exports towards politically and commercially more unstable low-
income countries. Rather, publicly indemnified trade finance has promoted
exports, to a modest degree, towards high and middle-income countries, where
financial intermediaries and markets provide viable alternatives to hedge
against payment risks.
Keywords Export credit insurance · Export promotion · Default risk ·
Gravity equation
JEL Classification F13
As soon as the cost of producing and delivering goods is not counterbal-
anced by instantaneous payments, the desire for trade finance arises. Indeed,
debt instruments such as trade credits permit firms to finance the delays that
arise in successive transactions without having to surrender internal funds.
Meanwhile, such a temporary detachment between pecuniary and goods-
transactions exposes firms to the risk of default. Incomplete information as
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regards the creditworthiness of foreign buyers, the menace of a political or
financial crisis, or the hazards involved in enforcing international contracts,
exacerbate the risk to be confronted with incomplete transactions in cross-
border trade finance.
To mitigate against such risk, banks and insurance companies offer a wide
range of policies indemnifying exporters against the losses from defaulted
trade credits that mature within 12 months. Conversely, owing to a combina-
tion of aggravated levels of incomplete information and the menace of risk
contagion across entire countries or even regions, the private export insur-
ance industry is arguably reluctant to cover long-term and political risks.1
This applies in particular when trade credits involve a sovereign buyer in
a developing country. Nevertheless, to provide trade credit insurance for
firms wishing to export towards countries suffering from nonmarketable lev-
els of default risk, most OECD countries maintain export credit agencies
(ECAs)—either in the form of ministerial departments, or publicly owned or
supported insurance companies—commissioned to issue trade credits with a
state-guarantee. Export promotion and the desire to open up risky markets—
which are primarily located in developing countries—for international trade
have, among others, been put forward as rationales for public intervention in
the export insurance industry. Yet, the public promise to bail out financially
unsound insurance portfolios may put ECAs in a position to cover export
credits at premiums deemed unprofitable by the private industry. The lure
of inconspicuous export subsidisation has lead to international agreements
such the OECD’s “Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits”
(hereafter ‘Knaepen Package’) to prevent the issuance of state-guarantees on
trade credits distorting competition in the export insurance industry.2
According to the Berne Union (2006, p.169), an international organisation
representing the credit and investment insurance industry, in 2004, public
and private export insurance companies underwrote almost 800 billion US$
worth of new trade credits, collected around 5 billion US$ in premiums, and
disbursed claims of around 3.4 billion US$. Thereby, almost 90% of business
was issued by private banks and insurance companies for the short-term,
e.g. on export transactions clearing within 12 months (Stephens 1998, p. 5).
Conversely, despite underwriting less than 10% of the grand total of policies,
ECAs backed by a state-guarantee held a far larger market share in medium
and long-term export credit insurance (Fingerand and Schuknecht 1999) that
accounted for around 60% of collected premiums and 80% of the disbursed
claims.
1See Fingerand and Schuknecht (1999) and Alsem et al. (2003) for an overview of the structure of
the export insurance industry.
2Other trade regulators have adopted rules on the legal conduct of public export insurance
schemes. The WTO’s “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures” outlaws bailing
out unprofitable export insurance schemes with public funds as illegitimate industry subsidisation.
By means of the Council Directive 98/29/EC, the European Union attempts to harmonise the rules
underlying the public provision of medium and long-term export credit insurance across member
countries.
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In spite of their implications for the international trading system, ECAs
have received relatively scant attention in the economic literature. Notable
exceptions include Dewit (2001), who adopts a political economy perspective
to suggest that ECAs installed to mitigate against nonmarketable payment
risks may instead pursue development aid policies or respond to lobbying
efforts by industries seeking subsidised insurance. Thereby, risky export mar-
kets exacerbate the caveats invoked against strategic trade policies insofar
as the degree to which firms avert the risk that foreign buyers default on
their financial obligations, affects the design of the welfare-improving export
insurance scheme. Therefore, successful export promotion in the form of
issuing trade credits with a state-guarantee necessitates information in excess
of the amount already deemed unobtainable in case of instantaneous financial
transactions.3 Arguably, vested interests provide more compelling theoretical
rationales to explain why public ownership and financial guarantees are upheld
within the export insurance industry. Other papers include Abraham and
Dewit (2000), who conclude for the case of the Belgian export insurance
scheme, that subsidised insurance tends to be offered primarily to firms
trading with former colonies. Finally, Dewit (2002) suggests that public export
insurance schemes distort the incentive of multinational firms to invest in local
plant capacity in favour of shipping commodities to foreign markets.
Against this background, the present paper endeavours to estimate some
of the empirical implications of the economic theories on the interrelationship
between the public provision of export insurance and international trade. In
particular, based on a gravity equation augmented with the contingency of
default on international payments, the principal contribution lies in estimating
the empirical extent to which various insurance policy parameters such as
payment risks, insurance coverage, premium rates, or asserted claims end up
affecting a country’s exports. To this end, a new panel has been assembled
containing data on the volume of export insurance officially supported by
OECD countries between 1999 and 2005.
Results suggest that in spite of public export insurance schemes, the risk of
foreign default continues to impede international trade in countries suffering
from aggravated levels of political and commercial instability. Furthermore,
for the 1999 to 2005 period, there is evidence that issuing trade credits with
generous state-guarantees has, to a modest degree, promoted exports to high
and medium-income countries, but has been ineffective in opening up low-
income countries for more international trade.
The remainder is organised as follows. Section 1 derives a gravity equation
to extract the hypothesis on the relationship between export flows and the pub-
lic provision of export insurance policies. Section 2 confronts the hypothesis
with the data by consecutively introducing the data set, the empirical strategy,
and discussing the results. The final section summarises and concludes.
3Based on a slightly different model where export credit is offered at below market interest rates
rather than covered by subsidised insurance, Carmichael (1987) reaches a similar conclusion.
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1 A gravity equation with risky exports
Attributing cross-country flows in goods to differences in economic mass
(size) as well as cultural and geographical proximity remains the canonical
framework for conducting empirical analysis in international trade. However,
it was not until Anderson and Wincoop (2003) that the gravity relationship
was firmly integrated into a general equilibrium framework. Drawing on
Abraham and Dewit (2000) as well as Dewit (2001), this section adds to the
gravity equation the contingency that exporting firms are confronted with the
risk of default against which insurance from officially owned and supported
export credit agencies (ECAs) can be taken out. Linking the value of exports
with export insurance parameters such as payment risks, premium rates, or
prospective indemnities allows to extract theoretically underpinned priors, on
the basis of which econometric equations will be specified to measure how
ECAs impinge on international trade.
In each importing country j, the demand for product brands manufactured
by the representative firm of exporting country i decreases in price pij, relative
to the consumer price index Pj, and increases in economic size in terms
of national income Yj. Then, nominally valued imports for commodities are
given by xij = (pij/Pj)1−σ Yj with σ > 1 denoting the constant elasticity of
substitution.4
As noted at the outset, insofar as payments do not occur on a frictionless
basis, exporters are confronted with the risk of contracting defaulting buyers.
To promote exports in risky markets where private insurance is off-cover,
ECAs underwrite insurance on behalf of the state, reimbursing an amount
γij in case of default against collecting a premium rij per insured currency
unit. Residents in country j declare insolvency with exogenous probability λj.
Letting R(qij) denote revenue, the expected profit accruing to exporting qij to
market j is
E
[
πj
] = (1 − λj
)
R
(
qij
) + (λjγij − rij
)
R
(
qij
) − ciτijqij (1)
where the factor τij ≥ 1 reflects natural and artificial trade barriers that add up
to marginal production cost ci. Insurance policies that charge actuarially fair
premiums and offer comprehensive coverage, that is rj = λj and γij = 1, permit
full insulation against payment risks since then E[πj] = πij = (1 − λj)R(qij) −
τijciqij. Owing to the implicit assumption of risk neutrality, buying no insurance
(γij = 0, rij = 0) would leave firms with a profit level they deem equivalent.
However, due to asymmetric information about the probability of default or
the frictions involved in international contract enforcement, export insurance
markets are arguably incomplete, in particular when it comes to obtaining
coverage against the event of political instability. To correct such alleged
4For further details on this see e.g. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003, pp. 174–175).
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market failure, firms may want to lobby the public to issue state-guarantees
allowing insurance companies to charge premiums that do not accurately
reflect the probability of default (rj < λj). This gives, in turn, rise to the desire
to take out maximal insurance coverage γij yielding the highest expected return
in the event that an exporter is confronted with default.5 Such public schemes
mandate, however, subsidies when sij(γij, rij) = λjγij − rij ≥ 0 with ∂s∂γ > 0 and
∂s
∂r < 0. To militate against financially unsound insurance portfolios—a practice
outlawed as illicit export subsidisation under OECD and WTO regulations—
ECAs may want to impose coverage ceilings that leave some of the risk with
the exporter, e.g. γ ij < 1 (see Abraham and Dewit 2000; Dewit 2001). Markets
with particularly patchy credit histories may even be put completely off-cover.
Furthermore, Henry (1987) as well as Boote and Ross (1998) attribute the
fact that many public insurance schemes report profits, despite covering risks
considered nonmarketable by private insurers, to overvalued prospects of
making recoveries ρ on claims involving, in particular, a sovereign borrower.
Anticipating a public bailout may indeed allow to write-off overdue payments
issued with a state-guarantee in a less prudent manner. Coverage ceilings and
recoveries, thus, enable ECAs to fund an export insurance portfolio where
disbursed claims exceed collected premiums without necessarily inflicting
losses upon the taxpayer, that is
πECA = ρij + rij − λγ ij = ρij − s
(
γ ij, rij
) ≥ 0 (2)
Detailing revenues by R(qij) = qij pij = pij(qij)pij and introducing Eq. 2 into
Eq. 1 implies that expected profits from exporting to country j are given by
E[πj] = [1 − λj + s(γ ij, rij)]pij(qij)qij − τijciqij. The price
pij = ciτij
(1 − 1/η)(1 − λ + s(γ , r)) (3)
that satisfies profit maximisation increases in trade costs (τij) and markup
(1/η), where η denotes the industry elasticity of demand, and decreases in
more generous export insurance schemes, on which for the sake of notation,
subscripts have been suppressed. Assuming that markets are structured by
(Dixit–Stiglitz) monopolistic competition implies that firms face horizontally
sloped demand curves, that is η = ∞, under which positive mark-ups are
competed down.
To obtain the gravity relationship, we follow the five steps in Baldwin
and Taglioni (2006) that are (1) adding up per variety export demand xij
5To see this, observe that the second term on the right hand side of Eq. 1 contributes maximally
to expected profits in case (rj < λj) and (γij = 1). According to Abraham and Dewit (2000) as well
as Dewit (2001), exporters exhibiting some degree of risk aversion desire to insure fully even if
premiums are actuarially fair.
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across the number, ni, of brands to obtain the total value of exports, Xij,
between countries i and j (2) introducing profit maximising prices of Eq. 3
that account in particular for the role of export insurance (3) adding up the
total value of exports, Xij, across all foreign markets j which yields the identity
for national income Yi (4) proxying for market potential by parameterising

j = ∑j
[
τ 1−σij
Yj
P1−σj
]
, and (5) solving the identity for national income Yi for ni
and substituting back into the total value of exports Xij.6 This yields the basic
gravity relationship
Xij = YiYj

j P1−σj
[
(1 − λ + s(γ , r))
τij
]σ−1
(4)
insofar as the value of exports, Xij, originating in country i and destined for
country j (a) increases in joint economic size, YiYj, as measured by the product
of national income and (b) decreases in bilateral trade and tariff costs τij.
As regards the effect of public export insurance schemes, Eq. 4 gives rise to
the further hypotheses that (c) modest payment risks λ (reflecting political
and commercial stability on foreign markets) and (d) issuing state-guaranteed
export insurance at subsidised rates s(r, γ ) (e.g. premiums and recoveries are
inadequate to cover prospective claims) tend to promote exports between
i and j. Recall, however, from the discussion on Eq. 1 that such an impact rests
on the assumption that insurance markets are incomplete. Otherwise, financial
markets or the private insurance industry would already absorb payment
risks to such and extent that additional securities would not affect a firms’
desire to engage in international trade. Against the background of the present
gravity equation, the following section endeavours to confront the resulting
hypotheses with the data.
2 Export credit insurance in OECD countries
This section presents the methodology and results of what is to our knowledge
the first comprehensive study on the extent to which export credit agencies
(ECAs) supported by OECD member countries achieve their stated objective
of promoting trade in favour of national industries. Thereby, Eq. 4 encapsu-
lates the ways in which public insurance schemes might give rise to exports in
excess of exchanges reflecting countries’ economic size as well as natural and
artificial trade barriers.
Data have been collected from several sources for the years between 1999
and 2005. In particular, export values at which the 30 OECD members trade
6See Baltensperger and Herger (2007) for detailed discussion.
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with other countries around the world were extracted from the IMF Direction
of Trade Statistics (DOTS).7
The enactment of the Knaepen Package in 1997 has led the OECD to
publish annual statistics on “Export Credit Activities” reporting to what extent
collected premiums, disbursed claims, and retrieved recoveries contributed to
annual cash flows, as well as the volume of newly insured export credit broken
down according to reporting and recipient country. Based on that, Dewit
(2001, pp. 577–580) proposes to employ disbursed claims as a fraction of col-
lected premiums and recoveries as a suitable proxy for public export insurance
subsidisation, that is s(r, ρ) ≈ claims/(premiums + recoveries).8 Furthermore,
using a scale from 1 to 7, the OECD releases a regularly updated classification
of the default risk inferred to accrue to international trade. For the year 2005,
Table 4 of the Appendix lists countries according to their scores. On this
basis, member states have agreed on a formula to militate against competing
ECAs charging premium rates that are “inadequate to cover the long-term
operating costs and losses” (Knaepen Package, Art. 22) and thus initiate
premium rate convergence. Coverage ceilings, e.g. the maximal proportion
of defaulted exports subject to indemnification, are surveyed in the OECD’s
“Export Credit Financing Systems in OECD Member Countries and Non-
Member Countries”. However, on markets suffering from aggravated levels of
economic and political uncertainty, the percentage loss ordinarily disbursable
may be subject to additional terms and conditions. In particular, export
insurance to countries scoring a 7 on the OECD’s default risk assessment is
frequently only available against additional collateral or even completely put
off-cover.
Table 5 of the Appendix summarises public insurance policy and trade
variables across OECD member countries.
For the 1999 to 2005 period, ECAs within the OECD reported a total of
almost 100 billion US$ worth of newly underwritten business which accounted
for about 3% of worldwide—private and public—export insurance activity
as reported to the Berne Union.9 As regards percentages of exports covered
in individual countries, Korea (0.93%), Japan (0.58%), Canada (0.54%), and
France (0.33%) granted the highest levels of support to domestic industries. By
contrast, Iceland and Ireland do not maintain public export insurance schemes
and New Zealand’s Export Credit Office (ECO) has reported no medium and
7Gravity equations typically draw on more comprehensive bilateral trade flows (see e.g. Baldwin
and Taglioni 2006). However, the present study looks into the extent to which ECAs impact upon
domestic exports wherefore the policy target of unilateral trade flows will serve as dependent
variable.
8To measure subsidies rather profits on insurance policies, the original measure proposed by
Dewit (2001) has been reversed. Alternatively, premiums could be related to the volume of newly
underwritten business to proxy for average export insurance conditions. This leaves the amount
of disbursed claims and retrieved recoveries unaccounted for. Nevertheless, the undermentioned
results are by and large not sensitive to employing alternative proxies for the level of premium
subsidies.
9This figure has been calculated for the 1999 to 2004 period as figures for 2005 are not available
from the latest edition of the Yearbook of the Berne Union.
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long-term (e.g. more than one year) exposures during its first years in business.
As regards the percentage of received medium and long-term export insurance
relative to the grand total of policies issued by OECD countries, the largest
recipient countries were mainly emerging markets such as China (8%), Iran
(5%), Mexico (5%), Turkey (5%), Brazil (3.5%), Russia (2.5%), and India
(2%) but also included the United States (10%). In contrast to the 1980s
and the beginning of the 1990s, when many public export insurance schemes
suffered from structural deficits (see Dewit 2001, pp. 377–380), on aggregate,
premiums and recoveries sufficed to cover claims that were issued during the
1999 to 2005 period by OECD countries.
2.1 Econometric specification
Measuring the empirical impact public export insurance schemes exhibit upon
the value of exports (X) necessitates transforming the gravity Eq. 4 into an
econometric model
ln(Xij,t) = β1 ln(Yi,tY j,t) + β2 ln(τij,t) controls
+β3 ln(λ j,t) + β4 ln(γ i,t) + β5 ln s(r, ρ) export insurance
+αij + αt + ij,t unobserved effects (5)
where ij and t index for panel observations across pairs of exporting and
importing countries and years between 1999 and 2005, respectively. Loga-
rithmic transformations (ln) mitigate against heteroscedasticity and convert
estimated coefficients into elasticities whose magnitudes lend themselves to
direct comparison.
The panel data of Eq. 5 can be grouped into control and export insurance
variables. Thereby, covariates appearing as capital letters will be employed
for estimation in the next section. A synoptic overview of their sources and
definitions is relegated to the Appendix.
Control variables include ECONOMIC SIZE as measured by joint gross
domestic product, e.g. Yi,tY j,t, which is expected to produce a positive entry
as larger markets tend to support more trade. Average bilateral TARIFF
rates impose artificial trade costs (τ ) giving rise to an anticipated negative
relationship with exports. Exports to just under one fifth of countries are not
subject to any tariff barrier, which partly reflects the recent surge in bilateral
and multilateral agreements granting preferential market access. In common
with most gravity equations, bilateral DISTANCE between capital cities,
nominal variables designating countries with a common LANGUAGE or
BORDER, as well as whether or not countries are LANDLOCKED account
for some of the natural trade frictions. Note that such geographic attributes are
time-invariant.
The second line of Eq. 5 contains export insurance variables. These in-
clude the payment RISK (λ) accruing on foreign markets as proxied by the
aforementioned OECD classification, the maximal percentage COVERAGE
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(γ ) insurable by state-supported schemes, as well as SUBSIDIES (s(r, ρ)) as
defined during the outset of this section.
Econometric pitfalls to estimate Eq. 5 are twofold. Firstly, for country-pairs
with particularly small markets and high trade costs, the corner solution of
zero-valued exports may prevail, which calls for Tobit estimates.10 Secondly,
to account for unobserved components, the final line of Eq. 5 introduces
a vector of time dummy variables, αt, country-pair specific effects, αij, and
an idiosyncratic error term, ij,t. In particular, αt shifts intercepts according
to years to offset global trends in inflation.11 In case country-pair specific
effects αij are exogenous, they can be modeled as random effects. Otherwise,
fixed effects permit to proxy for what Anderson and Wincoop (2003) label
multilateral trade resistance e.g. trade frictions such as red-tape, incomplete
information, cultural differences, or bureaucratic delays, which do not lend
themselves to direct observation.
2.2 Baseline results
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 report random effects estimates from regressing
ECONOMIC SIZE, trade cost, and export insurance variables of Section
2.1 on to the value of exported goods and services across more than 4,000
country-pairs with in excess of 14,000 observations. The first column employs
linear least squares as the estimation technique. Meanwhile, column 2 employs
a random effects Tobit framework (hereafter ‘RET’) to better account for
the 400 observations from 99 country-pairs that did not attract exports from
OECD members during at least one of the years between 1999 and 2005.
Here, covariates are supposed to control for relevant trade variables to such
an extent that the unobserved country-pair effects αij merely introduce an
additional source of randomness. By means of an array of fixed effects αij,
columns 3 and 4 account for the heterogeneity across country-pairs in a
more robust manner absorbing time-constant variables such as DISTANCE,
LANGUAGE, LANDLOCK, or BORDER. Then again, column 4 adopts
fixed effects within a Tobit framework (hereafter ‘FET’).
Control variables enter all specifications with the expected sign in the sense
that trade flows tend to increase with joint market size and decrease in trade
costs as measured by low tariffs and geographical and cultural proximity in
terms of country-pairs with closely located capital cities, direct access to the
sea, or sharing a common language and border.
10Note that a 1 is added to export values to avoid zero-valued observations from dropping out
when applying a logarithmic transformation.
11Alternatively, nominal variables might be deflated by means of price indices. The caveat against
this lies in the excessive amount of information needed to correctly adjust for price changes
accruing to trade and income variables as inherent in the variables Pj and 
j of Eq. 4. Indeed,
most countries do not publish separate price indices for traded goods and services (Baldwin and
Taglioni 2006).
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Table 1 Exports and export insurance
Panel techniques Random effects Fixed effects
estimation method Linear least Tobit Linear least Tobit
squares (RET) squares (FET)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Econ. size (Yi,tY j,t) 0.708*** 0.713*** 0.358*** 0.283***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.028) (0.017)
Distance −0.142*** −0.153**
(0.002) (0.001)
Language 0.584*** 0.414***
(0.032) (0.016)
Landlock −0.474*** −0.442***
(0.020) (0.011)
Border 1.322*** 1.960***
(0.057) (0.030)
Tariff −0.162*** −0.057*** −0.037*** −0.017
(0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
Risk (λ j,t) −0.487*** −0.525*** −0.311*** −0.258***
(0.019) (0.010) (0.047) (0.042)
Coverage (γ j,t) 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.010 0.015
(0.010) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009)
Subsidy (s(r, ρ)) 0.001 0.085*** 0.016** 0.025***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Intercept −10.65*** −10.57***
(0.193) (0.061)
N 14,501 14,501 14,663 14,663
Country-pairs 4,130 4,130 4,159 4,159
Log likelihood −14,171 −7,305
R2 0.851 0.983
The dependent variable is the value of EXPORTS. All specification contain country-pair (αij) and
time-specific effects (αt) . Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
*Coefficients are significant at the 10% level
**Significant at the 5% level
***Significant at the 1% level
Export insurance variables in the form of COVERAGE ceilings and in-
ferred premium SUBSIDIES reveal in how far more generous public insurance
schemes offset payment RISKS and therefore induce firms to ship more
goods to risky markets. The statistically significant entry of RISK suggests
that exporters are reluctant to ship goods towards markets with a notoriously
patchy credit history in spite of export insurance to hedge against defaulted
payments. The threat of opportunistic foreign buyers refusing to pay for
consigned commodities may well undermine a firm’s willingness to assume a
trade credit. According to North (1990), economic exchanges conducted at
arm’s length rest indeed on carefully balancing the establishment of a robust
political and legal mandate to safeguard contractual obligations against the
threat of authorities abusing the surrendered public power for private benefit.
Aggravated uncertainties inherent in international trade are likely to reinforce
the role of an efficient and reliable institutional design, which exporters can
fall back on if confronted with default.
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According to the positive entries of COVERAGE and SUBSIDIES of
Table 1, issuing export credits with more generous state-guarantees tends to
promote trade. However, when introducing fixed effects, COVERAGE fails
to produce significance. Furthermore, compared with the impact of payment
RISKS, the magnitude of coefficient elasticities of export insurance variables
appears to be rather modest. Indeed, even with the comparatively large
estimates of column 2 of Table 1, simulations predict that exports within the
current sample would have increased by a mere 2% would all OECD countries
have adopted self-funded insurance schemes that fully cover defaulted pay-
ments. Of note, such “trade creation” would involve substantial commercial
risk that appears neither to be marketable nor politically supportable at
current conditions. By way of contrast, were payment frictions in all countries
to be reduced to a level consistent with a score of 1 for RISK, across the current
sample, exports are predicted to increase by 15%.
Though random effects allow exploiting cross-country variation, which
provides the primary source of heterogeneity when analysing trade flows, it
is also prone to omitting unobserved variables and lead to biased statistical
inference (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006). Fixed effects yield, within the cur-
rent sample, substantially smaller estimates. Indeed, the difference between
coefficients of columns 1 and 3 or columns 2 and 4 provides the basis for
conducting a Hausman-test, which, with test statistics χ2 of, respectively, 83.87
and 1,556 rejects the hypothesis of consistent random effects estimates at any
conventional level. Owing to their robustness, the remainder will therefore
assess the extent to which ECAs promote exports within a FET framework.
Of note, employing alternative methods would not have reversed the sign of
any entry, but primarily affected the inference on coefficient’s significance. For
the sake of brevity, these results are not reported here.
2.3 Further results and robustness checks
To offset the vast differences in the proliferation of secure payments across
countries,12 ECAs typically adjust their insurance policies according to the
degree of risk involved. According to Abraham and Dewit (2000), this man-
ifests primarily in reduced coverage and higher premium rates when countries
witness aggravated levels of default risk due to e.g. high levels of external
debt, insufficient foreign currency reserves, low rates of economic growth, or
modest financial inflows in terms of foreign direct investment. To account for
the more basic export insurance on foreign markets where payments are less
likely to occur on a contractual basis, the first column of Table 2 interacts
export insurance SUBSIDIES and COVERAGE with the inverse of RISK.
The results lend further support to the abovementioned finding that public
export insurance schemes fail to offset the default risk and only modestly
promote exports.
12For a discussion on the origin of the vast differences in creditor protection around the world see
e.g. La Porta et al. (1997) or Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).
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Table 2 Exports and Export Insurance according to Sub-samples
Sample Risk adj. Without Income group Former
insurance risk 7 High Middle Low colonies
(2) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Econ. Size (Yi,tY j,t) 0.282*** 0.415*** 0.335*** 0.410*** 0.076* 0.182*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.036) (0.020) (0.041) (0.099)
Tariff −0.017* 0.014 −0.089** −0.027** −0.208*** −0.035
(0.011) (0.011) (0.034) (0.013) (0.043) (0.065)
Risk (λ j,t) −0.226*** −0.071 0.647*** −0.268*** −1.046*** −0.457**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.119) (0.052) (0.191) (0.203)
Coverage (γ j,t) 0.016* 0.011 0.016 0.006 0.028 14.52**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (5.826)
Subsidy (s(r, ρ)) 0.025* 0.020*** 0.033*** 0.018** 0.017 −0.060*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.034)
N 14,663 10,691 4,364 6,799 3,500 352
Country-pairs 4,159 2,876 2,026 2,262 1,169 115
Log likelihood −7,304 −5,004 −1,952 −3,466 −1,391 −40.95
The dependent variable is the value of EXPORTS. All variables are expressed in logarithms.
Estimation is made by fixed effects Tobit (FET). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses
*Coefficients are significant at the 10% level
**Significant at the 5% level
***Significant at the 1% level
Even ECAs issued with a state-guarantee tend to put extremely risky
markets, which are e.g. experiencing political unrest or financial crisis, at least
temporarily off-cover. Column 2 of Table 2 controls for this by dropping
countries scoring a 7 on the OECD’s assessment of the prospect of insecure
payments. Then, RISK no longer produces a significant entry suggesting that
the various modes of export insurance as well as financial instruments suffice to
hedge against the menace of default, unless pervasive levels of commercial and
political instability are involved. Again, the impact of more generous export
insurance schemes remains moderate.
As noted at the outset of Section 2, publicly supported export insurers tend
to target their activities to emerging markets rather than to the financially and
economically least developed countries. Against this background, columns 3
to 5 of Table 2 divide the sample into low, middle, and high-income coun-
tries according to the classification of the World Bank (see Table 4 of the
Appendix). This does not overturn the aforementioned finding that public
export insurance schemes are, by and large, ineffective in offsetting the impact
of payment risk upon trade flows.13 To a modest degree, OECD countries
13In high-income countries, RISK enters with a positive sign. Countries scoring a default risk
higher than 2 despite having relatively high incomes include Bahrain, Cyprus, Israel, Qatar, and
Saudi Arabia. Potentially, in oil-rich countries and countries located in areas with a history of
armed conflict, some of the trade-off between exporting and payment risks remains opaque.
Indeed, excluding these countries yields a negative and significant sign on RISK. Likewise,
employing the RET framework suggests that exports across high income countries tend to
decrease in the probability of default.
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appear to have offered export insurance that expanded trade with high and
middle-income countries. By contrast, public export insurance policies seem
not to have opened up low-income countries for higher volumes of trade. Pos-
sibly, ECAs face fiercer private competition on higher income markets which
forces them to offer more comprehensive policies. Across all groups, coverage
ceilings restricting the indemnification of export credits fail to promote exports
in a statistically significant manner.
Finally, Abraham and Dewit (2000) find that during the 1990s the
Belgian OND granted export insurance at subsidised rates primarily to former
colonies. Though comprising a mere 115 country-pairs with 352 observations,
the final column of Table 2 supports this observation with particularly large
impacts arising from the provision of more generous coverage ceilings.
Following the theoretical consideration by Dewit (2001), assuming more risk
on behalf of the exporting firm seems indeed to provide a potential loophole
for ECAs wishing to distribute subsidies without infringing international regu-
lations that prohibit charging inadequately low premium rates.14
3 Summary and conclusion
For OECD countries and the 1999 to 2005 period, gravity equations uncover
the following principal patterns between exports and public export insurance
parameters such as default risks, coverage ceilings (e.g. the maximal pro-
portion of trade credit subject to indemnification), and premium subsidies
(inferred from the extent to which premium revenues and recoveries cover
disbursed claims):
• Publicly supported export insurance schemes absorb at most some of
the hazards that risky payments introduce to trade. Insecure payments
continue to impede trade primarily in countries with pervasive political
and commercial instability.
• To a modest degree, ECAs seem to have extended trade with high and
middle-income countries. Conversely, for trade with low-income countries,
public insurance schemes appear to have been irrelevant.
• The view that export insurance programs, such as those run by OECD
countries, are employed to promote trade with former colonies finds
further support. Ostensibly, some trade credits between countries with a
shared colonial history received rather comprehensive coverage relative
to the default risks involved.
14The results of this and the previous paragraph are by and large robust towards interacting
insurance policy variables with default RISK in order to reflect the more comprehensive protection
typically offered when trade is directed towards affluent countries.
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• In general, subsidy rates rather than coverage ceilings seem to have
provided the policy parameter through which exports have been promoted.
The reluctance of private banks and insurance companies to cover some of
the commercial and most of the political risk in financially underdeveloped
markets serves as rationale for issuing trade credits with a state-guarantee.
Owing, among else, to their commercial and political instability, it has been
primarily the low-income countries, which have hitherto not benefited fully
from the recent growth in global trade. In case incomplete insurance markets
offer only limited possibilities to hedge against the risk of non-payment, public
insurance schemes are, thus, supposed to promote trade and open up risky
markets to trade.
Against that, the judgment on public export insurance schemes must be
mixed. Though such schemes appear to have promoted trade towards middle
and high-income countries, they failed to facilitate trade with low-income, and
thus rather unstable, countries. Further caveats apply. It remains particularly
unclear, whether or not this rather modest level of export promotion provides
a sufficient reason for exposing public finance to what is essentially a risk
accruing to a small fraction of exporting firms. As with any insurance scheme,
issuing trade credits with a state-guarantee may furthermore give rise to
adverse incentives, e.g. when exporting firms engage in excessive risk taking.
For countries wishing to support their export industry, the benefits of public
export insurances schemes should therefore not be overestimated nor their
caveats be underestimated. Plainly, public export insurance schemes permit
countries to circumvent, but not to even out, payment frictions. However,
countries typically owe their patchy credit histories to a combination of
dysfunctional legal institutions, poor macroeconomic policies, and political
instability. Rather than maintaining a public ownership stake in an ECA, this
suggests that international trade could benefit in a more sustainable way from
efforts that directly work against the various sources underlying payment risks.
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Data Appendix
Tables 3, 4, 5
Table 3 Description of the data set
Variable Description Source
Exports Exports in logarithmic US$ million. Original Direction of Trade
values have been added with 1 to allow for Statistics, IMF
logarithmic transformations on zero-valued
export activities
Economic Joint gross domestic product (GDP) across World Development
Size country-pairs in logarithmic US$ million Indicators (WDI),
World Bank
Tariff Average tariff rate levied upon and weighted TRAINS database,
according to the value of imports. In cases World Bank and World
where countries have entered a Free Trade Trade Organisation
Agreement or Customs Union, tariffs equal 0
Distance Great-circle distance between capital cities Compiled
in terms of (logarithmic) kilometres
Language Nominal variable for a common official language Compiled from
“CIA World Factbook”
Landlock Variable indicating for country-pairs that 0 = Compiled from ‘
neither of them is landlocked, 1 = one of them “CIA World Factbook”
is landlocked, 2 = both of them are landlocked
Border Nominal variable for a common border Compiled from
“CIA World Factbook”
Risk Assessment of the risk of default on international Compiled from OECD
payments on a scale from 1 to 7 with higher
values designating higher risk
Coverage Coverage ceiling designating the maximal insur- Compiled from OECD
ance coverage against default due to political “Export Credit Financing
risks an exporter can take out from public Systems in OECD
export insurance. To allow for a logarithmic Member Countries and
transformation in countries without public ex-
port insurance, original values are added with 1
Non-Member Countries”
Subsidy Measure of export insurance subsidies in terms Compiled from OECD
of the amount of funds ECAs disperse in claims “Export Credit Activities”
as a fraction of collected premiums and
retrieved recoveries, that is claims/(premiums+
recoveries). To allow for a logarithmic
transformation in countries without public
export insurance, claims are added with 1
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